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Abstract. Searching for common ground in philosophy, science and theology, it seems 
to us that it would be reasonable to maintain the position of realistic pragmatism that 
Charles Sanders Peirce had called pragmaticism. In the pragmaticist manner, we typify 
the knowledge and select the types of knowledge that might be useful for understand-
ing the problems that are of interest to us.
We pose a question of how it would be possible to obtain practically useful informa-
tion about reality, first from the perspective of natural sciences, and then from that of 
theology; that is, to diversify the ways of knowledge and just maybe, to move toward 
a productive dialogue between science and religion.
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Introduction
The secularisation of Western Europe, which seems to have culminated 
at the end of the twentieth century, has made science responsible for the 
questions that had traditionally belonged to the domain of religion (Midgley 
1992). Maybe this is the necessity of avoiding existential issues that has 
directed ideologists of science to take a more conciliatory position towards 
religion than they did half a century ago. This may be one of the motivators 
for opening and continuing the dialogue between science and religion. In 
the last third of the twentieth century there was a resumption of interest in 
the dialogue between science and religion, and this dialogue quickly became 
one-sided. Even today the prevalent opinion is that the religions should 
“update themselves” and become synchronized with sciences; however, the 
sciences would also do well to acknowledge the importance of religions and 
recognize some of their values, but religions have nothing of consequence 
to add to science (Granten 2010). Scientists often seem to be restricted 
by what Thomas Nagel calls ‘the fear of religion’ but Nagel demonstrates 
neither hatred against religion nor the contestability or inadequacy of 
religious beliefs. Nagel claims that atheists have no bigger reason to fear 
the relationship between spirit and world than they do the fundamental and 
irreducible laws of physics (2003, 130–131). Theology can sometimes use 
some concepts, methods, and thoughts that are also applicable to science, 
but the fear of religion prevents scientists from comprehending that the 
discussion does not have to lead to a god, even though the customary pat-
terns of discussion are far from traditional for the scientist. It may happen 
that if they are to engage in a productive discussion on existential issues, 
the sciences also need to synchronize with religions or theology and yet 
maintain their fundamental paradigm. Unlike the natural sciences, it is quite 
common to theology to treat everything as united and related as a result of 
their relationship with the root cause: the creator, or god. Religion binds 
what is close and far, and keeps open the possibility for a change of mind, 
self-transformation, and self-transcendence. 
A dialogue is productive if it results in the discussants incorporating 
some theological metaphysical statements into the statements of natural 
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sciences in a way that recognizes the conclusive statements from the point 
of view of scientific thought. A further objective would be to describe phe-
nomena whose existence or non-existence can be proved by experiments 
accepted by the natural sciences.1 We deal with the issues of truth, reality 
and knowledge, as these overlap with the concerns of natural sciences, 
unlike other existential questions.
In seeking common ground in philosophy, science and theology, it 
would be reasonable to maintain the position of realistic pragmatism that 
Charles Sanders Peirce called pragmaticism (CP 5.414)2, to distinguish it 
from other forms of pragmatism. As the later form of pragmatism is better 
known, therefore, considering the position of Peirce, we emphasize that this 
one is not typical pragmatism. Moreover, pragmaticism is often regarded as 
one form of pragmatism. Yet as these two groups differ on the question of 
truth, we need to distinguish pragmatism from pragmaticism. In cases when 
these groups are better considered together, we use the term pragmat(ic)ism.
The structure of the article is as follows.
The following section determines what kind of knowledge could be 
related to the existential questions of truth, reality and knowledge and how 
it relates to the scientific knowledge, by using Ronald Dworkin’s approach to 
community personified. Pierce’s pragmaticistic approach allows us to typify 
and select the types of knowledge that might be useful for understanding 
the problems that are of interest to us.
The second section explores the investigation of reality, first from 
the perspective of the natural sciences and then from the perspective of 
theology. Theology refers here to a method, not to the doctrinal content of 
a particular denomination, and we are looking for a means of methodological 
communication between theology and science. Concerning reality, reality 
in the sense of ‘real’ (the real or really existent world that exists whether 
1 This does not refer to the evidence for God but to phenomena that may be complicated to 
explore from the materialist point of view, such as free will and the intuitive perception of 
truth.
2 We use the common way of referring to The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce : CP, 
followed by the number of the section. CP: Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1994, edited by John 
Deely, Membra Ficte Disjecta: Electronic edition.
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it is observed or not), must be distinguished from a representation based 
on sensory perception (‘world-environment’), whereas in a productive 
dialogue the question of difference, sameness, or overlap could be regarded 
as experimental rather than as speculative.
The third section searches for a way to reconcile achievements in science 
with theology. We ask how it would be possible to obtain practically useful 
information about reality as really existent, whereas the effectiveness of 
examination of reality may depend on how widely and synergistically all 
the knowledge available to humankind could be used.
The conclusion is that today a productive dialogue between science and 
theology is possible. This dialogue can also be productive from a scientific 
point of view, since it is possible to explore science nonscientifically but 
nevertheless in a way that is acceptable to scientists.
1. On types of knowledge
The standard model of knowledge claims that knowledge is justified true 
belief, wherein the subject bears knowledge, and the object of knowledge 
is a proposition. This definition was attacked when Edmund Gettier cited 
examples (Gettier’s counterexamples) of beliefs that are true and also 
justified, but thinking of them as knowledge is counterintuitive (1963). 
After Gettier’s criticism, definitions of knowledge have become more 
sophisticated and their complementing process appears to be continuing 
(Pritchard 2009). It is possible to weaken Gettier’s criticism in terms of 
scientific knowledge, taking into account that scientific knowledge should 
be considered as collective knowledge. It is also important for the formation 
of scientists’ individual knowledge, because while relying on collectively 
gained knowledge, a scientist participates in shaping collective knowledge.
Peirce emphasizes the importance of collective knowledge in science. 
He often seems to refer to the scientific community, as he discusses how the 
researchers working in parallel arrive at a certain truth (Anderson 1995, 19). 
Following the example of Dworkin, one can consider a group of persons (e.g., 
scientific community) who are competent in a certain field and who com-
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municate with each other as a community personified (1986, 167–168ff.). We 
look at the community personified as a unity or super person, indicated by Z. 
In addition, the object of knowledge, what is known, may not be expressible 
by the proposition. For example, knowing a paradox, which can be expressed 
by contradictory propositions, or even inexpressible knowledge, which – by 
making an attempt to express it – results in an inadequate expression that 
can still can be understood by a member of the community. For example, 
one mathematician can understand another even if the used expression has 
no content and is internally inconsistent, for instance the expression “the 
set of all sets” (Moore 1990, 191–192). Theology would need the ability to 
express the inexpressible when speaking about god.
Instead of speaking about the proposition, it would be more general to 
speak about the object of knowledge (o), which might be a proposition, but 
this object might be expressed in any other way, for example, as a paradox. 
Now we define the knowledge of the community personified using the 
pre-Gettierian scheme:
Z knows that o if and only if (i) Z believes that o; (ii) the belief of Z that 
o is true; and (iii) the belief of Z that o is justified while Z is a knowing 
supersubject (a community personified) and o is an object of knowledge 
that may be a proposition.
Let us abbreviate it as z-knowledge – a super person Z’s justified true 
belief (Kasak and Veede 2016). Experience demonstrates that communities of 
researchers in a field characteristically hold both specialist and general notions 
that do not usually require additional justification to the social group. The body 
of scientists can be viewed as personified communities both as a whole and 
in parts; scientific knowledge can be seen as the knowledge of a community. 
The standard definition of knowledge may be implemented to the 
individual subject. If subject S has immediate access to the content of the 
object of knowledge, for instance, if it is a personal perception of mind or 
thought constructions, then such knowledge could be called s-knowledge, and 
the standard model of knowledge seems quite an appropriate description.
Both s- and z-knowledge are based on the context, which may be partially 
or completely explicitly inexpressible. Kant distinguished the category or 
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concept of understanding [Notio, Verstandesbegriff] from the idea or con-
cept of reason [die Idee, oder der Vernunftbegriff] (1968, 326)3. Ideas do not 
bring immediate benefit to the applications of the experience of concept 
of understanding, but participate in creating for them a harmonising and 
regulatory background. Kant’s concepts of understanding are indeed a priori, 
but are only meaningful when represented with objects of experience: they 
cannot be applied outside of that experience. Kant’s ideas and categories 
are subjective and his approach to the issue of universals is similar to that 
of conceptualists. However, we are observing them from the position of 
realistic pragmatism or pragmaticism. What is real, exists whether it is 
perceived or not (CP 5.430). Peirce usually regards an idea as a concept 
(1878), but there may be something real in it, “... the idea does not belong 
to the soul, it is the soul, which belongs to the idea” (CP 1.216). Thinking 
may, of course, include inadequate or fictional concepts that do not concern 
the reality, though they are true in the sense that they are being thought 
of. Peirce calls these ideas erroneous, and the idea that Peirce says to be 
true, usually denotes something general, and it is real. Below, we will use 
a specific expression, i.e., “real ideas” for denoting these ideas. A real idea 
is capable of influencing its owner in a way that in the owner’s thought 
it is represented as a conception (or idea in the sense that Peirce uses it).
Realists can talk about knowledge without subject. Karl Popper intro-
duced the concept of the “third world,” which embraces the objective content 
of thought (1968, 333–34). This made it possible to distinguish subjective 
knowledge from objective knowledge as belonging to the third world. The 
elements of the objective knowledge are human creations and therefore 
imperfect. According to Popper, they are similar to Frege’s understanding 
of the objective content of thinking, and differ from Plato’s ideas (Popper 
1994, 108–09). But because of their objectivity they are not Kant’s ideas or 
categories, whereas Popper also postulated the existence of the third world 
as independent from other worlds. Peirce’s real ideas differ from Popper’s 
by the fact that according to Peirce the real ideas are not a human creation 
3 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 377/A 320.
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-- quite the opposite. Neither are these the ideas of Plato, because Peirce’s 
ideas do not have to be perfect and unchanging (CP 6.13).
Knowledge can be distinguished on the basis of universality, such as 
factual knowledge, knowledge of universals (including the laws of nature), 
or even more general knowledge (Kant’s ideas) that organize knowledge 
of categories and universals, and which may be formulated as principles. 
A realist tries to see behind ideas something existent, and many – or even 
most – scientists are realists. The knowledge of the Peirce’s real ideas may 
be propositional or non-propositional and they can be distinguished on 
the basis of Kant. This is justified by the fact that Peirce’s philosophy is 
influenced by Kant (see CP 4.2). Peirce has said that Kant’s idea penetrates 
into the depths, where the daylight hardly reaches, and that Kant thinks 
quite correctly when he does not think clearly (1902, 209–10).
A realist would say that Kant’s concept of understanding and the concept 
of reason should come from something real, not from the nature of thinking 
itself. Kant denies the existence of universals as things, but recognizes the 
universals as concepts that represent things. However, Kant is not a pure 
conceptualist, for conceptions themselves are not universal—only their 
use is (Oberst 2015). Kant’s universals belong to the field of logic, not 
metaphysics. Kant thinks that human knowledge has two stems – logic 
and experience – that grow from a single root unknown to us (1968, 66)4. 
According to a realist, Kant’s concept of reason could be perceptible, and the 
knowledge of it is termed u-knowledge (u referring to universals), whereas 
this is propositional knowledge. Knowledge about objects that in Kant’s view 
appear as ideas (concept of reason) are termed i-knowledge (i referring to 
Kant’s ideas). I-knowledge could be the participation or involvement in the 
real ideas functioning outside of us. It is quite problematic if not impossible 
to express as propositional knowledge, but sometimes it can be expressed as 
principles or by paradoxes. Expressing i-knowledge as a principle is likewise 
problematic. It seems that it is necessary to differentiate i-knowledge 
from u-knowledge, although the demarcation line between propositional 
u-knowledge and non-propositional i-knowledge is blurry and changing.
4 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 30/A 16.
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Scientists should be characterized by their tendency to question their 
knowledge and beliefs. But i-knowledge places the scientist in an awkward 
position, because the ideas are extremely difficult to control by experiment. 
For instance, when the cosmological idea is formulated as a principle, 
it would be very difficult to verify the validity of some principles in the 
Universe as a whole. The metaphysical statements compiled based on 
i-knowledge can be involved in the same discussion with the scientific 
claims, however, using the habitual methodology, these claims are not 
scientifically verifiable, such as the cosmological principles of Giordano 
Bruno. However, i-knowledge can be beneficial for science. It seems that 
Peirce, when studying cosmology (and using his philosophically elaborate 
method) was quite successful in putting i-knowledge to use (Kasak and 
Veede 2016). The influential theoretical physicist Lee Smolin has recognized 
the main postulates, predictions and issues of Peirce’s cosmology (2013, 
125–29). Nobel laureate Steven Weinberg refutes doubts as if philosophy 
has nothing new or useful to say to physicists about reality, and cites Peirce’s 
philosophy as a positive example (2003, 205).
The objective content of both u-knowledge and i-knowledge can be 
treated without a subject (objective knowledge in Popper’s sense), becoming 
aware of it can take place collectively (z-knowledge) or individually. The 
question arises about the veracity of such knowledge. In case of propositional 
knowledge, a realist, relying on the correspondence theory of truth, can 
say that the discussion of objects embraced by a proposition is successful 
when a proposition is true and unsuccessful when it is false. A pragmat(ic)
ist will pay attention to whether the proposition could be pragmatically 
operable, i.e., if the proposition is true, then something in empirical or 
mental worlds is different when compared with the state of affairs if the 
proposition is false (James 1908, 142). Proposition and its truth value 
ought to be at least potentially operable, either for a person, a community 
personified or, in fact, any subject capable of understanding the contents 
of the proposition. Also, in case of i-knowledge, the object of knowledge 
should be at least potentially operable, although the description of it as 
a proposition is problematic.
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In solving the problems of artificial intelligence, any system can be 
postulated to be a carrier of knowledge, which can provide meanings for the 
signs (representation), and use these meanings purposefully. Peeter Lorents 
defined the element of knowledge as a consecutive pair <sign, significance> 
and this does not contain the subject in a manifest form, but like data that 
has to be on a carrier, the sign-significance relation must also have a car-
rier, which could be called a knower (2001). Knower masters the language, 
which determines the syntax of signs (representations) and semantics of 
significances. Significance, in turn, may be a sign for something else.
Following Peirce, we can say that representation (sign by Lorents) is 
a sign only if there is an object symbolized by this representation – there 
must be the object, representation and carrier of significance (CP 2.228). 
The object may belong to the physical, mental or fictional realm. A realist 
can define a realistic knowledge (r-knowledge), which could be a consecutive 
triplet <object, representation (sign), significance (interpretant)>, in which 
an object in the real world would correspond to the token. The representa-
tion-significance relationship has to have a carrier (knower), but its existence 
can be just potential. Objective realist knowledge requires the (potential) 
existence of an interpretant of infinite power, whereas the knowledge of 
the interpretant of finite power may be incomplete. Realist science strives 
for Z being as powerful carrier of the relation of the object-representation - 
significance as possible. If we assume the (potential or actual) existence 
of a carrier with an infinite power of knowledge relations, then perhaps 
there is not much difference in terms of objective knowledge, whether it is 
the world of the content of objective knowledge (Popper’s World 3), or the 
scholastic view that real objective knowledge exists in the mind of God, or 
even elsewhere.
Concerning knowledge, we cannot bypass the problem of justification.5 
In case of s-knowledge it would be natural to choose the internalist position 
as the subject must have immediate of access to the basis of her beliefs.
5 About justification of the beliefs that serve for a basis of knowledge, see e.g. Pritchard 
(2009).
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If there is no such direct access, then it seems that an internalist 
pragmaticist should choose a rather fundationalist position, whose beliefs 
are premised on the foundation. Realists have unfortunately no widely 
accepted mechanism that would say how the reality determines the 
justification. It is possible to postulate that the subject has an abnormal 
cognitive ability – the sense of truth – which tells the subject whether the 
object of knowledge is true or not; like the other senses, the sense of truth 
can deceive, but an experienced “observer of truth” is rarely mistaken, as 
any experienced observer. If a realist attempts to justify this postulate, 
a reference to Peirce can help her. But concerning the question of the 
possibility of immediate perception, Peirce seems to have had different 
positions. In some of his previous works, he seems to suggest that there is 
no immediate access to reality (1868), yet later he seems to recognize the 
power of immediate intuition. He calls such a method of direct perception 
of truth musement (1908, 93ff), and apparently it can also be interpreted 
in terms other than purely theological ones. Perhaps the issue of direct 
truth-observance emerges more in relation with objects of i-knowledge, 
whereas theology has studied some of these objects more often than 
science and Peirce himself categorises it among phenomena remaining 
outside the realm of science.
An externalist, specifically a reliabilist, will bind justification with 
reliability of the procedure of justification, and that is a procedure that 
results in true rather than false beliefs. Knowledge does not necessarily 
need justification for the reliabilist but it is necessary to obtain the beliefs 
in a reliable manner. Unfortunately, it is not clear how to test reliability 
externally. In science and social context, rather an internalist position 
is taken –anything that Z considers reliable is reliable. At the same time, 
however, there is an endeavour to bind knowledge with externalist type of 
justification, e.g., experiments that can give different results than expected, 
and change the procedures considered reliable and the content of reliable 
beliefs. Science is concerned mainly with verbally communicated knowledge, 
and reliability has been defined quite clearly in the case of the given Z. For 
example, in physics, reliable knowledge can be tested experimentally. Let 
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us call empirically verifiable knowledge e-knowledge. This is experiential 
knowledge that can be justified by different means. 
A pragmaticist perspective could use different types of knowledge, listed 
and briefly described below:
 − s-knowledge: subject has immediate access to the content of the ob-
ject of knowledge, e.g., personal perception via senses or a construct 
of thought
 − z-knowledge: the subject of knowledge is community personified
 − e-knowledge: empirically verifiable knowledge
 − r-knowledge: realistic knowledge from the point of view of pragmat-
icism, a consecutive triplet <object, sign, significance>, in which an 
object in the real world corresponds to a sign 
 − u-knowledge: knowledge of universals as of real ideas, it can be seen 
as a special case of r-knowledge
 − i-knowledge: participation or involvement in real ideas operating 
outside of us that are difficult to express as propositional knowl-
edge; sometimes it can be expressed in principles or paradoxes; ob-
ject of knowledge is manifested through the regularity or irregularity 
of other knowledge or non-conventional cognitive abilities (such as 
the sense of truth). 
These presented types do not provide classification for the term 
knowledge, since the semantic fields of the specified terms overlap, and 
it is not obvious whether they cover the whole semantic field of the term 
‘knowledge’. Below we see that these are important distinctions. By using 
them, the dialogue between science and religion becomes more understand-
able for both sides, since it is clear what aspect of knowledge her conversation 
partner has in mind. Searching for overlaps in philosophy, science and 
theology, mainly u-knowledge and i-knowledge are under attention below.
2. Ways of exploring the reality
A pragmaticist, being a realist, may postulate the really existent or real or pri-
marily existent, which exists whether it is observed or not. Regarding realism, 
there may arise a question of what me might call super-realism, where behind 
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each reality there can be even more real reality.6 But at the same time, this 
is where pragmat(ic)ism draws the boundary at which the movement along 
the hierarchy of reality remains speculative, because the reality, which is 
not pragmatically operable, cannot be, according to the pragmat(ic)ist, the 
object of effective productive discussion. Pierce’s real idea is pragmatically 
operable, because it is able to influence the subject. But the source of real 
ideas can be the subject of a meaningful discussion only if it is possible to 
notice its pragmatic operability, e.g., as an object of immediate perception or 
in a regulatory role regarding perception or thinking. If an object of knowing 
and believing accurately reflects the real relationship between real objects, 
then it is possible to talk about its trueness even then, when no subject nor 
society is aware of it. A pragmaticist can say that it is potentially possible 
to become aware of it because of operability. John Poinsot presented similar 
arguments in his discussion of the sign and the sign relationship as early 
as 1632, when he said that for signifying in a reality it suffices to be a sign 
potentially (1985, 125–126).
It seems that when discussing pragmaticistically, it is possible to use 
harmoniously the terms “reality,” “I myself,” “we” (which may be community 
personified Z), and various types of knowing about all of it, while scientists 
should be interested in u-knowledge, and they should understand the im-
portance of i-knowledge. The modern scientist tends to be a physicalist who 
thinks that the physical world described based on scientifically confirmed 
e-knowledge is the real world indeed, in which each person has a subjective 
representation and the communities might have still some intersubjective 
representations. Religion is a cultural phenomenon, which can help people 
6 A realist may consider as real the material world, where a human being believes oneself to 
live, similar to what is considered as real by the natural scientists. But it is possible that 
this so-called world-environment is not primary: it might be generated by a certain pri-
mary reality that may be very different from the world-environment. In this case realist 
may consider the primary reality more real and the world-environment less real. Primary 
world can be e.g. a programme that creates the world-environment and beings inhabit-
ing there as a computer simulation, see e.g. Bostrom (2003). And the world, where this 
computer programme works, can be created by even a more primary reality. The point of 
view, according to which there may appear behind each reality a “more real” reality, we 
are calling super-realism.
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to comprehend and cope with the world. Any community personified by 
this kind of scientific attitude may include both extreme physicalists and 
more liberal critical realists.
One should differentiate between two different kinds of experiences. 
Ordinary experiences occur in the course of daily life. However, birth and 
death, and mystical, religious or other unusual experiences are very difficult 
to align with naïve-realistic worldview based on materialism. We call these 
cardinal experiences. W. James considers religious experiences as real, and 
gives examples of how they transform a person’s life. In other words, they 
are pragmatically operable (2002). 
Cardinal experiences can lay the foundation for s-knowledge, which 
is not propositional, and not immediately communicative, but which can 
express the references that may be understandable for those with similar 
experiences. This could become z-knowledge for the community, which 
considers such experiences a reliable way of obtaining knowledge. From 
the point of view of the community of physicalists, s-knowledge, based 
on cardinal experiences, can be seen as irrelevant or inadequate, but with 
subjective value. Thus, a physicalist may postulate, for example, that all 
personal experiences that are not in accordance with physicalism are 
inadequate in the context of reality. In this case, s-knowledge of a person 
with her cardinal experience is only knowledge about that experience but 
this knowledge has nothing in common with other types of knowledge.
Science is based on the experience that a person is able to obtain 
knowledge via the five senses and their extensions. Using a rational anal-
ysis it discovers and formulates the rules that may be considered laws of 
nature. The regularities of thinking (logic) and of abstractions created by 
thinking power (mathematics) are treated separately. A scientific realist 
thinks that e- and u-knowledge from the field of natural sciences overlap 
at least partly with r-knowledge. For an instrumentalist perspective, these 
are merely convenient tools. A critical realist considers these to be the truth 
apprehensions that could not be accurate. Discussion on the scientifically 
unapproachable reality or the subject’s innermost beliefs cannot be an 
object of a meaningful scientific debate.
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We formulate the approach to the issue of the reality from the s c i e n- 
t i f i c  p o i n t  o f  v i e w: It is reasonable to talk about only such a reality, 
which can be studied by means of science. In a significant sense, reality is 
describable using matter and its properties. Direct knowledge about the 
reality is not achievable, and the knowledge mediated by the senses and 
thinking always turns out to be incomplete.
Scientific thinking could be characterized by considering the world as 
uniform and causal, non-dogmatic and having achieved certainty due to 
critical doubting. The traditional theological-religious way of thinking could 
be characterized by an understanding of a world as divided into accessible 
(in this world) and inaccessible (beyond it), criticism of this world and 
idealistic for the world beyond. According to this theological way of thinking 
or expression there exist two worlds -- this world (world-environment) and 
the world beyond – the latter being a bit more important and true than the 
former. The theological problems of this way of thinking occurred in the 
first centuries of Christianity: it was not clear how the two worlds were 
related to each other and how to express this relationship. Since Christianity 
is a religion that requires historicity and nature (because of the historical 
Jesus), we had to find a way to speak of about it using the available, but 
imperfect terms of Hellenistic philosophy. The term physis comes from 
physicalist philosophy. For centuries, Greek philosophy thought of being 
using terms like “thing, matter, and substance.” The individual as such, 
spontaneity, freedom, personality and its history were not considered 
categories of philosophy. In other words, with the wisdom of hindsight 
we now know that the notion expressed by the term physis fails to denote 
personal and free God, neither nature, nor people. To alleviate this problem, 
in the fifth century the Councils of Ephesus and Chalkedon suggested the 
communicatio idiomatum: a peculiar event of the language, which regulates 
the transfer of the characteristics between Jesus and God – God’s attributes 
(e.g., the Almighty, omniscience, cannot be transferred to Jesus) and about 
God, in turn, one cannot say anything except what is known from the life of 
historical Jesus. But Thomas Aquino, for example, suggested as a linguistic 
device the method of analogia entis (analogy of being).
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A pragmaticist can regard the world beyond as the primary reality. 
A creation of the world from this perspective can be seen as the process of 
how the primary reality generates the secondary world (world-environment). 
A naive-realist with ordinary experience would consider this secondary 
world as the real and only world. Both science and theology are still arguably 
inadequate for understanding of the reality, but perhaps we may use them 
together for understanding reality as we use our two imperfect feet for 
walking. Further, we approach theology on that note that what is said of 
God as the ultimate reality can be taken as valid about the primary reality. 
In this case the postulate of the existence of God as a particular being is 
being abandoned. A religious person might speak of having been created 
by God and the evolutionary process, a secular person expresses the same 
by claiming to have been created by the natural and historical process. As 
discussed above, objective realistic knowledge requires (potential) existence 
of an infinitely capable interpreter. When discussing such an interpreter, 
theological reasoning might be useful.
A theologian can consider adequate the knowledge obtained by a person 
in an unconventional manner, for example by means of revelation or insight. 
Some cardinal experiences can also occur through traditional cognitive 
ability, for example, I witness a miracle. Such knowledge can be i-knowledge, 
and is not adequately communicated. For example, a revelation is often 
a single, unique and personal phenomenon that cannot be shared with others 
directly. The means of communication are inherently communal, but there 
still remains a problem of adequacy of communication even if the revelation 
is communicated by the receiver. Even if the sense of truth accompanying 
the revelation confirms the infallibility of revelation, a sceptical “truth 
observer” might still have doubts. Like any sense, the sense of truth can 
deceive, and the source of revelation may be suspect. Religious institutions 
often assume the right to determine which miracles and revelations are 
true (of divine origin), and which are not, but sceptics will not acknowledge 
these institutions as validators of truth. 
The theological point of view admits the existence of revelations and 
may recognize that miracles are possible. However, it differs from the 
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sectarian understanding by the fact that theology observes such aspects of 
the revealed truths that are communicative. Like science, theology relies 
on rational analysis. In addition to dealing with human life and ethics, 
theology can also present the rules that seek to reflect the regularities in 
the objective world, whether it be understood as the world-environment or 
the primary reality. For instance, miracles can be confirmed by those who 
have borne witness, and a scientist may assume that the miracle needs 
a scientific explanation. Theology is not focused on the investigation of 
nature, but on directing human life, the course of which is determined by 
knowledge of the primary reality. Theology is concerned with the immediate 
knowledge of reality, but reality appears in particular in a mental and moral 
universe. The material universe is not a prevailing one. The development of 
knowledge is evolving towards understanding the content of the immediate 
perception of the reality and better communication of it. Although such 
a knowledge may not be propositional, an adequate communication within 
the framework of a community can, however, be possible. For it is sufficient 
if the speech refers to the personal experience shared by some members 
of the community. 
We formulate an approach to the reality from the  t h e o l o g i c a l 
p o i n t  o f  v i e w: this world (world-environment) can and must be studied 
by the natural sciences, but the natural sciences can produce only indirect 
information about the reality. The true (primary) reality is inaccessible to the 
senses, but it can be immediately perceptible by the mind. The verbalization 
of knowledge obtained this way is always incomplete. 
Those whose lives have been affected by cardinal experiences in conflict 
with physicalism, find it difficult to accept a scientific description of the 
reality. Some people do not agree with the ethics proceeding from the 
physicalist worldview. They may remark that physicalism also is a disput-
able position, with matter as a philosophical category, an abstraction and 
not experienced through the senses. But a description of the theological 
reality is not convincing to those who have had no conscious experience of 
the cardinal experience. Some people do not accept that God could affect 
their free will. Some people do not accept ethics based on the theological 
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worldview, and nowadays it is easy for them to find atheistic ideologies 
that disprove God, because God cannot be experienced by the senses from 
without nor can the existence of God be proved. For these reasons it is 
possible to affirm the inadequacy of the theological world theory. Even 
when having cardinal experiences, one can embrace a dualistic approach to 
the world, according to which there exist separate immaterial and material 
entities; at the same time it is not obligatory to share with the theologians 
their faith. The cardinal experiences belong to a human life, even scientific 
research requires cardinal experiences (e.g., intuition). Explanations of 
such experiences also need context and grounding unless explanations are 
sceptically or nihilistically renounced.
A pragmaticist can ask whether there is something pragmatically oper-
able in immediate knowledge about the primary reality. Some theological 
schools give an affirmative answer to this question. In this case, a natural 
scientist can ask whether this knowledge includes anything that can be 
typified as e-knowledge, or at least as i-knowledge. A pragmaticist who 
recognizes the cardinal experiences does not exclude the possibility of 
immediate knowledge and considers it possible that the primary reality may 
significantly differ from the world-environment. A pragmaticist can provide 
tools for how to look for rational assurances of existence and operation of 
such a primary reality, credible for the community of natural scientists. 
A pragmaticist cannot distinguish strictly separated from clearly defined 
science and religion, and then imagine them as something like countries 
at war. (This does not mean that the methodological reductionism is not 
useful for the specific research task).
For instance, reality can be understood by regularity, using u-knowledge 
or i-knowledge. If i-knowledge is achievable as immediate knowledge, and 
it is accessible to any community personified, it is worthwhile to explore 
the possibilities of its experimental affirmation without becoming bound 
by physicalist or theological ideology. The other way is to use the violations 
of regularity – the reality may appear as phenomena described by the facts 
that are not in accordance with the orderly conduct of the world. This 
may be indicated by the relationship characterized as the teleologically 
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directed regularity (miracle) or imperfection (déjà vu) between the reality 
and world-environment. As for scientific ideology, this could be a research 
object for the future science. As for theological ideology, this could be called 
miracles or deception, a research object for future theology. A pragmaticist 
may take seriously this rational method created by synergies in science and 
theology, which recognizes the possibility of immediate perception of truth. 
A pragmaticist may develop a rational way of perceiving reality, which can 
take advantage of the resources of both scientific and theological method, 
but may not be reducible to either of them. It seems that both methods are 
today still on a primitive and misleading level.
We can describe the approach to the reality from the  p r a g m a t i c i s t 
p o i n t  o f  v i e w. The primary reality can be sensually inaccessible through 
ordinary experiences, but its existence and properties can be referred by 
the cardinal experiences and by the regularity or irregularity of the link 
between the reality and the world-environment. Direct and communicative 
knowledge about the reality may be possible, but the methods for describing 
remain to be developed.
3. The possible synergy between science and theology  
in research of reality and of science itself
In expert use of language, such as philosophy, theology, or science, the 
conscious textual knowledge is of special importance and in science they 
are subjected to verification. But unconscious contextual knowledge will 
remain free from criticism. This creates a paradox in which unperceived 
knowledge is sometimes more certain than perceived knowledge. It is 
difficult to give up or to question a belief that you do not perceive. Like 
everyone else, scientists are not often aware of their beliefs; many of them 
are religious (or parareligious or quasi-religious) (Kasak 2011). Similarly, 
theologians are not always aware of the sources of their knowledge, which 
may very well be science, pseudoscience or parascience. 
Science is a social form of activity, which for a long time was considered 
possible to be analysed only by science. No wonder that the “new priestly 
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class” reserved all authority to judge knowledges and ideas to itself. Witt-
genstein noted that the meaning of the world must be located outside of 
the world (2002, 86)7 and the significance of a system is located outside 
of that system. The significance of science can also be looked outside of 
science. For example, the philosophy of science analyses the science using 
the non-scientific means. It seems that science can be studied by using 
theology, religious studies and anthropology of religion.
Each research specialty poses its basic questions from a perspective. 
For example, religion can be researched from the perspectives of biological, 
sociological, psychological, and philosophical knowledge. Each new perspec-
tive may add useful insights. The same applies also in science. Approaching 
science via research methods for religious studies we might ask in which 
way and to what extent the religious or other beliefs, practices and insti-
tutions that serve for a basis of worldview observed in science differ from 
the beliefs, practices and institutions functioning in other fields. A study 
could be made of whether there are similarities or overlapping or universal 
phenomena in science and religions, or whether there exist things that the 
majority of the religious, and/or scientific communities believe. A question 
might be posed about what kind of theological relationship occurs between 
the disciplines or between science and social context, or science and the 
natural environment.
Science has grown out of theology and the two have become separated 
as the connection between science and truth has been broken. This has 
resulted in a progressive profit-oriented attitude to research policy, research 
funding and the ideology of science. This attitude has begun to produce 
scientists who no longer believe in science as a means of perceiving truth, 
and this way of thinking is reflected in the public environment. Religious 
studies and anthropology of religion are studying what is observable and 
public – this means that their interest is not directed to the things that are 
located in people’s heads or hearts (and definitely not what takes place 
in the institutions). These disciplines deal mainly with comparative and 
7 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6.41
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transcultural aspects of religion. But they cannot resolve the methodolog-
ical problems of truth and wisdom concerning behaviour in the observed 
phenomena. A more traditional theology would be helpful here.
Theology today has often put on the disguise of science (on ideological 
or quasi-religious reasons) but there is at least one significant difference 
between science and theology. Science does not recognize the possibility of 
immediate perception of truth, or more precisely, although recognized, it is 
not considered good style. Theologies recognize the possibility that there 
is truth, it can be rationally incomprehensible, but it is still perceptible and 
therefore also researchable and describable. A scientist who knows about 
the philosophy of science generally dares to speak about the proximity of 
the truth, whatever it means.
Theology is controversial as a form of knowledge and imagination, 
especially today. It has a unique history and traditions of practice. It is 
often believed, for example, that theology is done in churches only or in 
the best case, there is added theology done in the universities or divinity 
schools. However, theology is practiced wherever somebody tries to answer 
questions about religious or inter-religious phenomena that deal with the 
universe in its depth. If in science, wisdom is related only to empirical facts, 
and the expansion of the sense of wisdom is suspicious, then theology can 
naturally regard wisdom in a much broader sense. A theologian, since 1991 
the Regius Professor of Divinity at the University of Cambridge, David F. Ford 
said, “Wisdom (although it is a difficult concept with different meanings 
and analogies in different traditions) is probably the best understood and 
least controversial term that can be used on theology. Wisdom involves 
describing, understanding, explication, knowledge and decision-making, not 
only about the empirical facts, but also in connection with values, norms 
and beliefs that shape life of individuals, communities and institutions” 
(2005, 61). Theology looks for wisdom in connection to the questions of 
meaning, truth, beauty and tradition, the issues that shape human life and 
that people talk about in their everyday colloquial conversations. But the 
colloquial terms can cautiously be converged to the terminology used by 
theology, as well as to those terms, which may denote a religious experience. 
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Perhaps we need theology outside of religious institutions and Western 
academic circles. This may add a new understanding of science and some 
phenomena. We may discover, for example, that science lost something 
important when it parted ways with theology. Perhaps this loss becomes 
more evident on the clear demarcation line between the modern science 
and “old-fashioned” theology.
A theological (religious) approach to science means that science is re-
searched as a phenomenon, whose real objectives cannot always be described 
rationally, some of them (the pursuit of truth) are similar to the pursuit 
of God and recognition of foolishness is similar to the confession of a sin. 
Science must be studied from the theological point of view to describe the 
aspects of research (as human activity), cannot be described in a scientific 
way but whose existence must be acknowledged and rationally dealt with if 
we want research to maintain the heuristic power that it has had for some 
time and if research is to continue to meet the societal expectations that 
we have of science. Science that falls short of these expectations is called 
“bad science.” Religion that does not meet the expectation of improving 
the quality of life is called “bad religion.”
There is a tendency to promote the abandonment of science as an 
alternative for bad science and to use the abandonment of religion as an 
alternative for bad religion. The long-term consequences of such choices may 
be unclear, but it seems that abandonment of the intellectual achievements 
of humankind will not solve its problems, but only help to conceal them. In 
order to identify and describe bad science, metaphysics or religion/theology, 
an effective and unconventional, out-of-the-system point of view and 
dialogue are needed. A productive dialogue, in addition to recognition, will 
help to explain in the freshest way what the meaning of science, theology/
religion and metaphysics could be for humankind, and in the course of the 
dialogue it is possible to seek the meaning of a system outside of that system.
One of the further objectives of a productive dialogue would be to 
describe the phenomena whose existence or non-existence can be verified 
experimentally by science and the development of the ideology of these 
experiments. This question deserves further and longer consideration. It 
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seems that here a pragmaticist point of view, developed in the course of 
a dialogue between science and theology and metaphysics, would be of value.
Conclusion
A productive dialogue between science and theology is possible, or more 
accurately, underway, but it should be openly acknowledged, and important 
questions and answers should be clearly formulated. Humankind already 
seems to possess the means for achieving immediate and future objectives 
of such a dialogue, but there is a lack of understanding of how to do it. 
Immaterialism should not be the object of ridicule. The scientific and 
religious imaginations may have parted their ways but they must share the 
same basic refusal to rest content with what we know. Willingness to travel 
to an unknown destination of the truth beyond the visible and material is 
not irrational, even if it may need non-rational for verification. The sense 
of truth and sense of participation in the world should not be excluded. 
It may be that in order to describe the reality we need the contributions by 
both science and theology. 
The preceding text is not meant to approve of scepticism, irrationalism 
and mysticism as they are usually understood. Our goal is to diversify the 
ways of rational cognition, to explore and learn to use consciously and in 
a structured way such ways of acquiring knowledge that are not reducible 
to the normal cognitive abilities and whose rationality is often seen as 
questionable. Perhaps in the future this way will allow us to rationalize 
what so far has tended to be irrational, as well as the part of the scientific 
creative process based on intuition and insight, and to imbue the mystical 
parts of theology with new meanings. 
A theological (religious) approach to science means that science is 
researched as a phenomenon whose real objectives cannot always be 
described rationally; some of them (e.g., the pursuit of truth) are similar 
to the pursuit of God. This restless faith is not a cultural universal. In 
fact, the endorsement of the inevitability of the status quo is much more 
prevalent. The long-term consequences of abandoning the search for truth 
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may be unclear, but concealment and denial are never helpful for solving 
the problems of humankind. 
The dialogue between science and theology is productive from a theo-
logical point of view, since the world-environment in which the theologians 
live is most productively studied by the sciences. This dialogue can also be 
productive from a scientific point of view, since it is possible to explore 
science non-scientifically but nevertheless in a way that is acceptable to 
scientists.
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